Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
UWRG Working Papers

Usery Workplace Research Group

7-3-2012

Does Universal Coverage Improve Health? The Massachusetts
Experience
Charles J. Courtemanche
Georgia State University, ccourtemanche@gsu.edu

Daniela Zapata
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, d_zapata@uncg.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers

Recommended Citation
Courtemanche, Charles J. and Zapata, Daniela, "Does Universal Coverage Improve Health? The
Massachusetts Experience" (2012). UWRG Working Papers. 62.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers/62

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Usery Workplace Research Group at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in UWRG Working Papers by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

W.J. Usery Workplace Research Group Paper Series

Working Paper 2012-7-3
July 2012

Does Universal Coverage
Improve Health? The
Massachusetts Experience
Charles J. Courtemanche
Georgia State University
Daniela Zapata
University of North Carolina - Greensboro

This paper can be downloaded at: http://aysps.gsu.edu/uwrg-research.html

ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL
OF POLICY STUDIES

Does Universal Coverage Improve Health? The Massachusetts Experience
Charles J. Courtemanche*
Department of Economics
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, GA 30303
and National Bureau of Economic Research
Phone: (404)413-0141
Email: ccourtemanche@gsu.edu
Daniela Zapata
Department of Economics
Bryan School of Business and Economics
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Box 26170
Greensboro, NC 27402
Phone: (336)334-5635
Email: d_zapata@uncg.edu
July 11, 2012
Abstract:
In 2006, Massachusetts passed health care reform legislation designed to achieve nearly
universal coverage through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies
that later served as the model for national health care reform. Using individual-level data from
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, we provide evidence that health care reform in
Massachusetts led to better overall self-assessed health. Several robustness checks and placebo
tests support a causal interpretation of the results. We also document improvements in several
determinants of overall health, including physical health, mental health, functional limitations,
joint disorders, body mass index, and moderate physical activity. The health effects were
strongest among women, minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with low incomes. Finally, we
use the reform to instrument for health insurance and estimate a sizeable impact of coverage on
health.
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I. Introduction
A major objective of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) signed into
law in March of 2010 is to increase health insurance coverage in the United States to nearly
universal levels through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies.
Although the law survived constitutional challenges, it remains at the center of political debate,
with possibilities remaining for full or partial repeal or denial of financing during the budgetary
process. This ongoing debate highlights the need for projections of the law’s impacts on health,
health care utilization, and state and federal budgets. The multi-faceted nature of the reform and
breadth of the population affected suggests that evidence from coverage expansions in other
contexts, such as Medicaid, will be of only limited usefulness.
The most similar intervention to date to the ACA is the Massachusetts health care reform
of April 2006, entitled “An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health
Care” and commonly called “Chapter 58” (Long, 2008). 1 The law enabled Massachusetts to
lower its uninsurance rate to 2% by 2010 through a strategy called “incremental universalism,”
or “filling the gaps in the existing system … rather than ripping up the system and starting over”
(Massachusetts’ Division of Health Care, Finance and Policy, 2010; Gruber, 2008a:52). Gruber
(2010) describes Massachusetts’ approach to incremental universalism as involving a “three
legged stool” of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies (Gruber, 2010).
The first leg of the stool reforms non-group insurance markets in an effort to ensure the
availability of coverage for those without access to employer-provided or public insurance.
Insurers are not allowed to deny or drop coverage based on pre-existing conditions (guaranteed
issue) or vary premiums to reflect health status aside for limited adjustments for age and
1

For a more detailed description of the law, see Long (2008), McDonough et al. (2006) and Gruber (2008a, 2008b).
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smoking status (community rating) (Kirk, 2000; McDonough et al., 2006). A health insurance
exchange, the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, offers plans developed by
licensed health insurance companies for those without access to group markets. Enrollment on
the Connector began in October 2006 for those with incomes below 100% of the federal poverty
line (FPL), in January 2007 for those up to 300% FPL, and in May 2007 for everyone else.
Additionally, private health insurance plans are required to provide coverage for young adults on
their parents’ plans for up to two years after they are no longer dependents or until their 26th
birthday (McDonough et al., 2006).2
This first leg alone would likely lead to adverse selection and a “death spiral” with rising
premiums gradually driving healthy individuals out of the non-group market. The second leg of
the three-legged stool therefore involves mandates requiring adults to be covered by health
insurance and employers to provide health insurance. Individuals without adequate coverage face
a penalty of half of the lowest premium they would have paid in a Health Connector-certified
plan. Employers with more than 10 employees must make a “fair and reasonable” contribution
toward an employer health insurance plan or pay a state assessment of up to $295 per full-time
equivalent worker per year (Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008).3 The
mandates took effect in July 2007.
To help low- and middle-income households be financially able to comply with the
mandate, the third leg of the Massachusetts reform provides subsidies and Medicaid expansions.
Chapter 58 specifies that health insurance be free for people below 150% FPL and that premiums

2

Guaranteed issue and community rating have been in place in Massachusetts since 1996. The 1996 law only
allowed premiums to vary with age and geography; Chapter 58 further allowed them to vary with tobacco use. The
insurance exchange and the requirement regarding young adults on their parents’ plans both started with Chapter 58.
3 Minimum requirements plans must meet to satisfy the mandates include coverage for prescription drugs and
preventive and primary care, as well as maximums on deductibles and out-of-pocket spending.
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be subsidized on a sliding scale for those between 150% and 300% FPL with no deductibles.4
The reform also expands Medicaid to cover children below 300% FPL (McDonough et al.,
2006).
Taking into account the costs of the subsidies and Medicaid expansions as well as the
savings from reduced safety net payments, Raymond (2009) estimates the annual fiscal cost of
the reform to be $707 million. Through a waiver allowing for a more flexible use of federal
Medicaid matching money, half of this amount comes from the federal government, leaving the
state government’s share at $353 million.
Table 1 compares Massachusetts’ approach to incremental universalism with that of the
Affordable Care Act. 5 Though there are differences in some of the details, both the
Massachusetts and national reforms were clearly motivated by the same “three-legged stool”
approach to incremental universalism. Both featured guaranteed issue, community rating,
insurance exchanges, mandates, Medicaid expansions, and subsidies. For these reasons,
analyzing the effects of health care reform in Massachusetts provides the best available predictor
to date of the implications of the Affordable Care Act.
Given that recent nature of the Massachusetts reform, researchers are only beginning to
understand its impacts. Long et al. (2009) find that by 2008 the uninsured rate decreased by 6.6
percentage points for the overall nonelderly population and 17.3 percentage points for lowerincome adults.6 Long and Stockely (2011) find a decrease in unmet medical needs because of

4

For instance, in 2008 a family with an income between 150% and 200% of the poverty line paid a premium of $35
per adult, while a family with an income in the 250% to 300% range paid $105 per adult.
5
Coverage expansion was the primary focus of both the Massachusetts and national reforms. However, the national
reform was more comprehensive, consisting of nine titles that each had their own reform agenda: I. Insurance
Coverage, II. Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, III. Delivery System Reform, IV. Prevention
and Wellness, V. Workforce initiatives, VI. Fraud, Abuse and Program Integrity, VII. Biologic Similars, VIII.
Community Living Assistance Services and Supports, IX. Revenue Provisions (Patel and McDonough, 2010).
6 These results support preliminary evidence found by Long (2008) using information from 2006 and 2007.
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cost among lower income adults but also some evidence of delays in care from being unable to
find a provider. Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) show that Chapter 58’s impact on coverage was
mitigated by the crowding out of private insurance. They also investigate the reform’s effect on
self-assessed health, finding mixed results: an increase in the probability of reporting at least
good health but a decrease in the probability of reporting at least very good health. Cogan et al.
(2010) estimate that the reform increased employer-sponsored insurance premiums by about 6%.
Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) show that the reform reduced levels of uninsurance by 36% among
the population of hospital discharges. Length of stay and the number of inpatient admissions
originating from the emergency room both decreased, with some evidence also suggesting an
increase in the utilization of preventive services, a decline in hospitalizations for preventable
conditions, and an improvement in quality of care. Miller (2011a) finds a reduction in non-urgent
emergency room visits, consistent with the newly-insured having access to such care in other
settings. Miller (2011b) focuses on children’s outcomes, finding a substitution from emergency
room care to office visits, a reduction in medical needs unmet because of cost, and an increase in
the probability of reporting excellent health. Kowalski and Kolstad (2012) exploit the reform’s
effect on employer-provided health insurance to show that wage reductions almost completely
offset the cost of health insurance benefits.
We contribute to this growing literature by examining Chapter 58’s effect on the selfassessed health of adults. Though many open questions remain about the reform’s effectiveness,
as Gruber (2011b:190) writes, “the most significant of these is the impact of reform on the health
of citizens.” We utilize individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS), which allows for the use of longer pre- and post-treatment periods, a much
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larger sample, and a broader range of health-related questions than Yelowitz and Cannon (2010),
enabling us to obtain clearer results.7
First, an ordered probit difference-in-differences analysis shows that the reform increased
the probability of individuals reporting excellent or very good health while reducing their
probability of reporting good, fair, or poor health. A variety of robustness checks and placebo
tests support a causal interpretation of the results. The estimates suggest that annual government
spending for each adult transitioned into excellent or very good health is $9,827, split evenly
between the Massachusetts and federal governments. We then provide evidence that the reform
improved a number of determinants of overall self-assessed health: physical health, mental
health, functional limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and moderate physical activity.
Next, we examine heterogeneity and find that the reform’s effect on overall health was strongest
for women, minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with incomes low enough to qualify for the
law’s subsidies. Notably, the estimates imply a 19% reduction in the disparity in self-reported
health between blacks and whites. Finally, we exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in
coverage created by the reform to estimate that obtaining health insurance leads to a large
improvement in health.
II. Health Insurance and Health
An important part of the argument for universal coverage is the assumption that health
insurance improves health. As quoted by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), Levy and Meltzer (2008)
write,
7

Specifically, Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) use Current Population Survey supplements and compare a pretreatment period of 2005-2006 with a post-treatment period of 2008. They conduct a difference-in-differences
analysis with other New England states as controls. Their sample size is 41,873. In contrast, we utilize data from
2001-2010 and have a sample size of 2,879,296 in our main analysis and 340,592 when we restrict the sample to
New England.
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The central question of how health insurance affects health, for whom it matters, and how
much, remains largely unanswered at the level of detail needed to inform policy
decisions. … Understanding the magnitude of health benefits associated with insurance is
not just an academic exercise …, it is crucial to ensuring that the benefits of a given
amount of public spending on health are maximized (p. 400).
This section provides a brief summary of theoretical and empirical research on the topic and
summarizes our contribution to this broader literature.
Grossman (1972) models health as a durable capital stock that is also an input in the
production of healthy time. Health capital depends on the initial endowment of health, past
period health, and past period investments made to preserve it. Medical care and time spent in
health producing activities are the main forms of health investment. Every period people face
uncertainty as to whether they will be affected by a negative health shock, so they buy health
insurance to protect themselves against unexpected medical costs. Because health insurance
reduces the price of care faced by the consumer it increases the demand for medical care (Arrow,
1963; Pauly, 1968). This increase in consumption of care could result in better health, but if the
additional medical care is redundant health outcomes may remain the same or even deteriorate.
This effect is sometimes known as “flat of the curve” medical care, because diminishing returns
in the health production function imply that at some point the health gains associated with more
medical care may be very small (Doyle, 2005).
The majority of empirical investigations into the relationship between health insurance
and health are observational studies that use multivariate regression analysis. A review of these
studies by Hadley (2003) shows that 15 out of the 20 published between 1991 and 2001 found a
positive association between health insurance coverage and recovery from health conditions such
as cancer, trauma, and appendicitis. Health insurance was also associated with better overall
health status and lower mortality risk in all of the studies that examined these outcomes.
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However, these relationships cannot be interpreted as causal because the research designs did not
address the potential for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality.
During the 1970’s the RAND Health insurance experiment randomly assigned families to
health insurance plans with coinsurance rates ranging from 0% to 95%, with all medical
expenses covered over a threshold. Medical care use increased among people assigned to plans
with lower coinsurance rates, but health outcomes only improved among the poor (Manning et
al., 1987). However, this experiment only shows the impact of health insurance along the
intensive margin from less to more generous coverage, not the extensive margin of no coverage
to any coverage. It is also unclear to what extent findings from the 1970s are applicable today.
Some studies have taken advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation provided by
public insurance programs like Medicaid and Medicare in order to address the endogeneity of
coverage. Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b) find that Medicaid expansions decrease infant
mortality and low birth weight, while Dafny and Gruber (2005) show that they also reduce
avoidable hospitalizations among children. Most recently, Finkelstein et al. (2011) exploit a 2008
Oregon lottery in which winners were given the chance to apply for Medicaid to show that
coverage improves self-reported physical and mental health. The randomization allows for clean
identification of the causal effects of Medicaid eligibility, at least among the low-income
uninsured lottery participants.
Evidence on the effect of Medicare on the health of seniors is mixed. Card et al. (2004)
find that obtaining Medicare coverage at age 65 improves the self-assessed health of Hispanics
and people with low levels of education; however, the effect for the whole sample is smaller and
insignificant. Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) show that 10 years after the introduction of
Medicare there was not a statistically significant impact on mortality rates for people older than
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65. Card et al. (2009) find more favorable results: a reduction in the 7-day mortality rate among
emergency room patients older than 65 compared to those right below that cutoff.
A few studies attempt to estimate the causal effect of insurance on health in contexts
other than public programs, again finding mixed results. Pauly (2005) uses marital status and
firm size as instruments for private insurance coverage and finds a positive but insignificant
effect of insurance on self-reported health and a negative but insignificant effect on the
probability of having a chronic condition. Doyle (2005) shows that uninsured patients receive
less medical care and have higher mortality rates than insured patients after a random health
shock (a car accident).
To summarize, the extant literature suggests that health insurance coverage appears to
improve health in some contexts but not others. The uninsured in the U.S. consist of a number of
groups, including those too sick to obtain coverage, those too healthy to feel insurance is
necessary, and those too poor to afford private coverage but not poor enough to qualify for
public insurance programs. Any attempt at universal coverage in the U.S. will therefore involve
coverage expansions across a highly heterogeneous group, making it unclear the extent to which
these prior findings are applicable. The Massachusetts health care reform provides a unique
opportunity to examine an intervention that affects a large portion of the uninsured population.
III. Data
Health summarizes a combination of factors that reflect physical and mental well-being.
Among the usual indicators used to measure health in empirical investigations are mortality
rates, hospitalization rates, and self-assessments of overall health. Our study focuses on selfassessments. State-level mortality information is not currently available for a long enough time
after the reform to construct an adequate post-treatment period. Even if more recent data were
8

available, examining mortality rates alone would not capture incremental improvements in health
resulting from, for instance, better treatment for a chronic but non-life threatening condition.
Hospitalizations are not an appropriate measure of overall health in this context since, to the
extent that hospitalizations are price sensitive, changes in hospitalizations after the reform might
simply be a direct result of the lower price faced by the newly-insured rather than changes in
health.
This paper uses data from the BRFSS, a telephone survey of health and health behaviors
conducted by state health departments in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. The BRFSS, which consists of repeated annual cross sections of randomly-sampled
adults, is well suited for our analysis for several reasons. First, the dataset contains the necessary
variables, including multiple self-reported health measures, demographic characteristics, and
state, month, and year identifiers. Second, since the BRFSS spans 1984 to 2010 and included all
50 states plus the District of Columbia by 1995, the data cover a long enough time period to
examine both post-reform outcomes and pre-reform trends. Third, the BRFSS contains an
unusually large number of observations – over 2.8 million in our analysis sample of 2001
through 2010. A large sample is critical to obtaining meaningful precision when examining the
impact of a state-level program with effects that might be concentrated amongst only a fraction
of the population.
Our main dependent variable is a self-reported health index asking respondents to rate
their overall health as poor (0), fair (1), good (2), very good (3), or excellent (4). This index has
been previously used by other studies analyzing the impact of health insurance on health (Card et
al., 2004; Pauly, 2005; Yelowitz and Cannon, 2010) and has been repeatedly shown to be
correlated with objective measures of health such as mortality (e.g. Idler and Benyamini, 1997;
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DeSalvo et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2010). According to Idler and Benyamini, another advantage
of the index is that it is a global measure of health that captures the full range of diseases and
limitations a person may have.
The primary concern with the self-reported health index is its subjective nature. We will
be able to flexibly control for the sources of reporting heterogeneity identified in the literature,
such as age, income, and gender (Ziebarth, 2010). Nonetheless, the estimated effect of the reform
on self-assessed health could still reflect factors beyond objective health. For instance, improved
access to medical care might increase awareness about medical conditions, causing one to selfreport a lower health status after obtaining insurance coverage, ceteris paribus (Strauss and
Thomas, 2007). In this case, the reform’s effect on self-assessed health would be smaller than its
effect on objective health. Alternatively, if the peace of mind from having health insurance
influences one’s answers to subjective health-related questions, the reform could lead to larger
improvements in self-assessed health than objective health.
Consequently, we also utilize a number of other health-related dependent variables in an
attempt to verify that the results for the overall self-reported health index are not driven merely
by subjectivity. First, we consider number of days out of the past 30 not in good physical health
and number of days out of the past 30 not in good mental health. These variables are somewhat
less subjective than the overall health index because the respondents are specifically asked to
consider a particular component of health. Even less subjective is the next health measure:
number of days out of the past 30 with health-related functional limitations. Our last five healthrelated dependent variables – an indicator for the presence of activity-limiting joint pain, body
mass index (BMI), minutes per week of moderate physical activity, minutes per week of
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vigorous physical activity, and an indicator for whether the individual currently smokes – are
quite specific and therefore the least open to subjective interpretation.8 9
We measure coverage with a binary variable reflecting whether or not the individual has
“any kind of health care coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or
government plans such as Medicare.” The BRFSS does not indicate the source of coverage or
provide any information on premiums, deductibles, or copayments. Finally, we utilize as control
variables the BRFSS’ information on age, marital status, race, income, education, marital status,
and current pregnancy status.
We also include four state-level variables as controls in a robustness check. The first is
monthly state unemployment rate, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Next, monthly
state cigarette excise tax rates come from The Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and
Walker, 2010) and are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, we use annual state hospital and
physician data from the Census Bureau to impute monthly estimates of numbers of hospitals and
physicians per 100,000 residents.10
Our analysis uses a ten-year window surrounding the reform, 2001 to 2010. Tables 2 and
3 compare the descriptive statistics for Massachusetts and the other states in the pre-treatment

8
BMI=weight in kilograms divided by height in squared meters. Self-reported weight and height are potentially
susceptible to biases. Some researchers utilize an adjustment developed by Cawley (2004) that predicts actual height
and weight based on self-reported height and weight using the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey,
and then applies the prediction equation to other datasets that only include the self-reported measures. However,
studies with BMI as the dependent variable have repeatedly found that applying this adjustment has little influence
on the results, so we do not use it here (e.g. Courtemanche et al., 2011).
9
The BRFSS gives respondents guidance for how to distinguish between moderate and vigorous physical activity,
reducing the subjectivity of these variables. Moderate activities include “brisk walking, bicycling, vacuuming,
gardening, or anything else that causes small increases in breathing or heart rate.” Vigorous activities include
“running, aerobics, heavy yard work, or anything else that causes large increases in breathing or heart rate.”
10
Monthly estimates were calculated using the formula:  =  + ( −  ), where  and  are annual
estimates, and  is number of months from  to  .
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period of January 2001 through March 2006. Prior to the reform, Massachusetts was already
healthier than the rest of the country along most dimensions and had a higher coverage rate.
Massachusetts residents averaged higher income and more education than those in other states,
and were more likely to be single and white. Massachusetts also had a relatively low
unemployment rate, high cigarette tax, high physician density, and low hospital density. These
baseline differences illustrate the difficulty in isolating the causal impact of Massachusetts’
health care reform. A naïve estimator using only a post-treatment cross section would attribute
the entire difference in health between Massachusetts and other states to the reform, including
the part of the difference that was already present prior to its enactment. Our empirical analysis
will therefore rely on a difference-in-differences estimator that controls for pre-treatment
differences in state health as well as a number of time-varying observable characteristics.
As a precursor to the regression analysis, Figure 1 plots the average values of the health
status index in Massachusetts and the 50 control states (the other 49 states plus Washington, DC)
every year from 2001 to 2010, along with their 95% confidence intervals. The graph also shows
linear pre-treatment trends for Massachusetts and the other states, computed by regressing the
mean health index on year plus a constant term. Consistent with the summary statistics from
Table 2, Massachusetts residents had better average self-assessed health than those in the control
states even before the reform. Despite this difference in baseline levels, the pre-treatment trends
in both Massachusetts and the other states were both downward sloping and – critically for the
validity of the difference-in-differences approach – almost exactly parallel. The year-to-year
fluctuations in the control states in the pre-treatment period are estimated very precisely and lie
almost exactly on top of the trend line, while the year-to-year fluctuations in Massachusetts are
estimated much less precisely and deviate more substantially. This underscores the importance of
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utilizing a sufficiently long pre-treatment period in the regression analysis. If, for instance, 2005
– a year in which health in Massachusetts appears to have been below trend – was the only pretreatment year, a difference-in-differences estimate might capture mean reversion in addition to
the causal effect.
After the reform was passed in 2006, health in the control states remained relatively
stable. In contrast, health in Massachusetts improved in 2006 – as the subsidies and Medicaid
expansions took effect in the early stages of the reform’s implementation – and again in 2009. 11
To more formally investigate whether these improvements were a causal response to health care
reform, we next turn to regression analysis. The regression results will broadly support the
preliminary findings from Figure 1, although we will see that in a regression context the health
gains did not appear until 2007.
IV. Regression Analysis
IVa. Baseline Model
We estimate the impact of Massachusetts health care reform on overall self-assessed
health status using an ordered probit difference-in-differences model.12 Suppose the underlying
relationship between the covariates and a latent variable representing health ( ∗ ) is given by
∗

=  +  ( ∗  ) +  ( ∗  ) + #!" $% + & + ' + (

11

(1)

Figure 1 may help explain the mixed results found by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010). Their pre-treatment years
were 2005, in which health in Massachusetts was off its long-run trend line, and 2006, in which a causal response to
the early aspects of the reform was possible. Their only post-treatment year was 2008, before the second spike in
the health in Massachusetts residents seen in 2009.
12 Given the strong distributional assumptions made by the ordered probit model, we also considered two more
flexible approaches to modeling the impact of the reform on health. The first estimates a series of four probits with
the dependent variables being indicators for fair or better, good or better, very good or better, and excellent health.
The second uses the same dependent variables but estimates linear probability models. The conclusions reached are
the same; the results are shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.

13

where i, s, and t are indices for individual, state, and month/year combination (e.g. January
2001).  is a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in Massachusetts. Following

Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we define  as a dummy variable equal to 1 from April

2006 to June 2007, the time period after the law had been passed but before all the key
provisions had been implemented.  is a dummy variable equal to 1 starting in July of 2007,

when the final major component of the reform – the individual mandate – took effect. #!"

consists of the age, marital status, race, income, education, and pregnancy variables listed in
Table 3. & and ' are state and month fixed effects, while ( is the error term.

∗
and instead observe an ordinal health measure  such that
We do not observe 



∗
0 if 
≤2
,
∗
*1 if 2 <  ≤ 2
∗
≤ 26
= 2 if 2 < 
+3 if 2 <  ∗ ≤ 2
6
8

*
∗
> 28
) 4 if 

(2)

where 2 through 28 are constants that represent the cut-off points. An ordered probit regression
of  on the covariates from (1) computes the following probabilities of being in each of the

five health states:

Pr( = 0) = Φ(> −  ( ∗  ) −  ( ∗  ) − #!" $% − & − ' )

Pr( = ?)
= Φ@>A −  ( ∗  ) −  ( ∗  ) − #!"$% − & − ' B
− Φ@>AC −  ( ∗  ) −  ( ∗  ) − #!"$% − & − ' B ∀ E ∈ (2,3,4)

Pr( = 4) = 1 − Φ(>8 −  ( ∗  ) −  ( ∗  ) − #!" $% − & − ' )

(3)
(4)

(5)

where >A = 2A −  , the cutoff points adjusted for the constant term. The coefficient of interest is

 , which captures the difference between the change in Massachusetts from the “before” to the
“after” period and the change in the control states from the before to the after period – in other
words, the “difference in differences.”
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Computing treatment effects in non-linear models has been the source of confusion in the
literature. Ai and Norton (2003) showed that the cross difference in a nonlinear model is
different from the marginal effect on the interaction term, and could even be the opposite sign.
However, Puhani (2008) showed that the cross difference identified by Ai and Norton (2003) is
not the same as the treatment effect, and that when the treatment effect is the parameter of
interest it is appropriate to focus on the coefficient of the interaction term. A similar observation
has been made by Terza (2012). Following Puhani (2008), our “treatment effect on the treated”
is given by

H( = 1,  = 1) = IJK | = 1,  = 1, , 'M − IJK  | = 1,  = 1, , 'M

(6)

where K and K  are potential outcomes with and without treatment. The “average treatment
effect on the treated” is the mean of this treatment effect across those individuals living in
Massachusetts in the “after” period (July 2007 through December 2009).
Because of the nonlinearity of the model, the treatment effect depends on the value of the
other covariates. The effects of the reform on the probabilities of being in each of the five health
states among the treated are
H ,NO," ( = 0) = Φ@> −  − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B − Φ@> − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B
H ,NO," ( = E)
= RΦ@>A −  − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B − Φ@>AC −  − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' BS
− RΦ@>A − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B − Φ@>AC − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' BS
∀ E ∈ (2,3,4)

H ,NO," ( = 4)
= 1 − Φ@>8 −  − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B − R1 − Φ@>8 − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' BS
= Φ@>8 − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B − Φ@>8 −  − #,NO," $% − &PQ − ' B

(7)
(8)

(9)

where the state subscript T has been replaced by  for Massachusetts, and  is restricted to the
“after” period.

15

The key identifying assumption in the difference-in-differences model is that  ∗

 and  ∗  are uncorrelated with the error term. In other words, the estimates

can be interpreted as causal effects of the reform if we assume that in the absence of the reform
changes over time in health would have been the same in Massachusetts and the control states,
conditional on the control variables. The similarity of Massachusetts’ pre-treatment trend in
health to that of the other states shown in Figure 1 provides preliminary support for this
assumption. We therefore use all 50 other states (49 states plus the District of Columbia) as the
control group in the baseline regression, and consider several alternatives in Section IVb.
Our standard errors in the baseline regression are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered
by state. As shown by Bertrand et al. (2004), conventional difference-in-differences methods can
over-reject the null hypothesis because of serial correlation even when standard errors are
clustered. We therefore use more stringent standards for statistical significance than usual: 0.1%,
1%, and 5% significance levels. In Section IVe we will more formally investigate whether
underestimated standard errors could be driving our conclusions.

The first column of Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for  ∗  and

 ∗  from the ordered probit regression, along with the average treatment effects on the

treated in the after period.13 The interaction term  ∗  is statistically significant at the
1% level and its effect on health is positive, suggesting than health care reform began to improve
the health of Massachusetts residents even before the reform was fully implemented. This is
plausible since some provisions of the reform, such as the Medicaid expansions and subsidies for
those below 300% FPL, started in 2006. The interaction term  ∗  is significant at the

0.1% level and its coefficient estimate is more than twice as large as that for  ∗ . Not
13

Coefficient estimates for the other covariates are available upon request.
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surprisingly, the effect of the reform strengthened once it was fully implemented. This could
either represent the impact of the later components, such as the mandate, or a gradual response to

the earlier components. The t-statistic for  ∗  is 6.5, meaning that our clustered standard
errors would have to be underestimated by a factor of more than three for the result to be driven
by autocorrelation.
The estimated average treatment effects show that the Massachusetts health care reform
decreased the probabilities of being in poor, fair and good health and increased the probabilities
of being in very good and excellent health. The drops in the probabilities of being in poor, fair,
and good health are 0.2, 0.5, and 0.7 percentage points, respectively, while the increases in the
probabilities of being in very good and excellent health are 0.2 and 1.2 percentage points.
We next conduct two back-of-the-envelope calculations to help assess the economic
significance of these estimates. The first consolidates the five treatment effects into a single
measure that attempts to quantify the overall increase in health. We multiply each of the
treatment effects by the value of the health status index associated with the corresponding
category (0 for poor, 1 for fair, 2 for good, 3 for very good, and 4 for excellent), and then divide
by the sample standard deviation. This result is an overall effect on health of 0.033 standard
deviations, shown in the third-to-last row of Table 4.14 The magnitude of the impact therefore
appears modest across the entire population, but perhaps large amongst the small fraction of the
population who experienced a change in coverage as a result of the reform and is likely driving
the results.

14

This calculation should be interpreted with caution, as it relies on the strong assumption that each incremental
increase in the health index represents the same improvement in health.
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The second calculation combines the estimated treatment effects with the information on
the reform’s costs from the introduction to compute the annual fiscal cost for each adult
transitioned from poor, fair, or good health to very good or excellent health. We do this first
considering total government spending (federal and state), and then using only Massachusetts’
share of that spending. The former provides a more relevant projection for national health care
reform, while the latter is more relevant for evaluations of the Massachusetts reform. 1.4% of the
adult population transitioned into very good or excellent health. The adult population in
Massachusetts was 5,138,919 in July 2010 according to the Census, so 1.4% translates to 71,945
individuals. Since the reform cost an estimated $707 million in FY2010, total government
spending is an estimated $9,827 per year for every adult whose health improves from poor, fair,
or good to very good or excellent. Since Massachusetts splits the costs evenly with the federal
government, the state spends approximately $4,914 annually per adult transitioned into very
good or excellent health. These calculations are far from complete cost-effectiveness analyses, as
they ignore costs to patients and private insurers as well as benefits from consumption smoothing
or improvements in children’s health. They do, however, provide some information about the
returns to government spending while underscoring the point that financing universal coverage at
the federal level is likely to be more difficult than in Massachusetts, as matching money is not
available.
IVb. Robustness Checks
This section further examines the validity of the identifying assumption of common
counterfactual health trends between Massachusetts and the rest of the country by considering a
number of alternative control groups and adding state-level covariates. First, we use as the
control group the ten states with the most similar pre-treatment average health status indices to
18

Massachusetts (“match on pre-treatment levels”). Second, we “match on pre-treatment trends”
by running regressions of average health on year plus a constant term for each state from 20012005 and then choosing as the comparison group the ten states with the most similar slopes to
Massachusetts. Next, we use a control group of the ten states with the most similar pre-reform
health insurance coverage rates (“match on pre-treatment coverage”). 15 We then consider a
control group consisting of the other New England states because of their geographic proximity
to Massachusetts. An additional specification excludes states that passed more limited health
care reforms during the sample period (California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon and Vermont).
The sixth robustness check constructs a “synthetic control group” for Massachusetts, as
described by Abadie et al. (2010). We first aggregate to the state-by-year level and allow the data
to select the combination of the other 50 states that best matches Massachusetts on health status
and the control variables during the pre-treatment years 2001-2005.16 The resulting control group
is 70.9% Connecticut, 11.3% Rhode Island, 8% Washington, D.C., 5.9% Utah, 3.7% California,
and 0.1% Arizona. Following Fitzpatrick’s (2008) application of this method to individual data,
we then multiply the weights for the individual-level observations by these shares, leaving
Massachusetts fully weighted and dropping the 44 states that received a zero weight.17
The next regression uses the rest of the country as the control group but excludes the year
2005. Recall from Figure 1 that in 2005 health in Massachusetts was below the trend line, raising
15

When matching on pre-treatment levels, the control states are Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont and Virginia. When matching on pre-treatment
trends, the control states are Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey and New York. When matching on pre-treatment coverage, the control states are Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Unreported
regressions used control groups of five or twenty states instead of ten; the results were similar.
16
We do this using the Stata module “synth” (Abadie et al., 2011).
17
In the “matching on pre-treatment levels,” “matching on pre-treatment trends,” New England, and synthetic
control regressions, the number of states is 11 or fewer. Angrist and Pischke (2008) note that standard errors
clustered by state are unreliable when the number of states is small. As they recommend, we instead cluster standard
errors at the state-by-year level in these four regressions.
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the question of whether the improvement in health from 2005 to 2006 could be due to a
temporary negative shock in 2005 rather than the reform in 2006. The long pre-treatment period
mitigates this concern by tempering the influence of 2005, but dropping 2005 addresses it more
directly.18
Finally, we return to the full sample but control for the potential time-varying state-level
confounders unemployment rate, cigarette tax rate, physician density, and hospital density, along
with linear state-specific time trends to allow for differential trends in health along unobservable
dimensions.19 Controlling for unemployment rate and cigarette tax could be especially important
given the differential impacts of the recession across states and the large cigarette tax increase
passed in Massachusetts in 2009.
We present the results of these robustness checks in Columns 2 through 9 of Table 4. The

coefficient of the interaction term  ∗  remains positive in all specifications, with

magnitudes ranging from 0.010 to 0.022, though it loses statistical significance in some of the
regressions with smaller control groups. In contrast, the interaction term  ∗  remains

highly significant in all specifications. The magnitude of its effect is stable, as it ranges from
0.032 to 0.049 and is always within the 95% confidence interval from the baseline regression. As
a result the treatment effects are also similar across specifications.

18
Other unreported robustness checks experimented with the use of shorter pre-treatment periods beginning in 2002,
2003, or 2004. The results remained very similar.
19
We relegate the state-level control variables to a robustness check rather than using them in the main analysis
because of concerns that some of them – in particular unemployment rate, physician density, and hospital density –
could be endogenous to health care reform. Moreover, the four state-level controls are all individually and jointly
insignificant, so the state fixed effects appear to sufficiently capture their influence on health.
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IVc. Testing for Differential Pre-Treatment Trends and Delayed Effects
This section simultaneously addresses two possible concerns with the estimates from
Table 4. First, the difference-in-differences approach assumes common counterfactual health
trends between Massachusetts and the rest of the country. The robustness of the estimates to
different constructions of the control group is consistent with this assumption, but conceivably
health trends in Massachusetts could be so unique that no appropriate comparison group of states
exists. Second, the preceding regressions do not differentiate between the short- and long-run
health effects of the reform following full implementation. Since health is a capital stock
accumulated through repeated investments, the improvements in health resulting from the reform
could increase over time. Alternatively, the long-term uninsured might experience a pent-up
demand for medical services after obtaining coverage, in which case the entire improvement in
health could be reached quickly or even be temporary.
We address these issues by re-estimating equation (1) with a broader set of interaction
terms. First, we divide the ten-year sample into five two-year periods and include interactions of
the Massachusetts dummy with indicators for 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2010
(leaving 2001-2002 as the reference period). A second regression interacts Massachusetts with a
full set of year dummies. These models test the common trends assumption by testing for
differential trends between Massachusetts and other states in the pre-treatment period 2001-2005.
If the treatment and control groups were trending similarly before the reform, then they likely
would have continued to trend similarly from 2006-2010 if the reform had not occurred. The
models also distinguish between short- and long-run effects by including multiple interactions
from the post-reform period.
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Table 5 displays the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms. The regression with
two-year splits shows that health trends in Massachusetts and other states were similar through
the pre-treatment period, with a sizeable gap emerging in the early period following the reform’s
full implementation (2007-2008) that grew only slightly in the later period (2009-2010). These
results are consistent with the reform having a positive causal effect on health, and with the
short- and long-run effects being similar. The results from the one-year splits are broadly similar,
with the exception that Massachusetts experienced a temporary negative health shock in 2005
that disappeared by 2006. At no point in the pre-treatment period was there a Massachusettsspecific health shock that lasted longer than one year, making it unlikely that the sustained
improvement in health in Massachusetts from 2007-2010 would have occurred in the absence of
the reform. Moreover, the regression excluding 2005 from Table 4 provides further evidence that
the negative shock in Massachusetts in 2005 is not meaningfully influencing our conclusions.20
IVd. Testing for Endogenous Moving Patterns
The Massachusetts reform’s coverage expansions likely appeal to individuals with preexisting conditions or a higher probability of facing future illness. This section therefore
addresses another possible concern: that Massachusetts attracted sicker residents after the reform,
either by making them less likely to leave the state or more likely to move there. If this is the
case, our estimates may understate the reform’s true effect on health, as the positive causal effect
would be tempered by negative selection.

20
As an alternative approach to testing the common trend assumption, in Appendix Table A3 we conduct three
falsification tests restricting the sample to the pre-treatment years 2001-2005. The first considers 2001-2003 to be
the “before” period and 2004-2005 the “after” period, while the second treats 2001-2002 as the “before” period and
2003-2005 as the “after” period. The third classifies 2001-2002 as the “before” period, 2003 as the “during” period,
and 2004-2005 as the “after” period. None of these tests produce any evidence of differential pre-treatment trends
between Massachusetts and the other states.
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We test for endogenous moving patterns by examining whether the demographic and
financial profile of Massachusetts residents changed following the reform in a way that would
suggest a change in the underlying propensity towards health of the state’s population. We first
conduct a linear regression of health status index on the individual-level control variables among
the pre-treatment portion of the sample, using the coefficient estimates to predict health for the
entire sample. We then estimate the influence of  ∗  and  ∗  , along with

the state and time fixed effects, on predicted health status. Table 6 reports the results. The
coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are both negative, consistent with Massachusetts
health care reform attracting sick individuals, but the effects are small and insignificant at the 5%
level. It therefore seems unlikely that endogenous moving patters are meaningfully attenuating
the estimated impact of the reform on health.
IVe. Tests Related to Inference
This section conducts tests to help rule out the possibility that the statistical significance
observed in the baseline regression is merely an artifact of underestimated standard errors. First,
following Bertrand et al.’s (2004) suggestion, we compress all the available data into a statelevel panel with three time periods – “before”, “during”, and “after” – and regress state average

health index on  ∗  ,  ∗  , and state and time period fixed effects. Next, we
compress the data into only two cross-sectional units – Massachusetts and other states – and ten
years, defining 2006 and 2007 as the “during” period and 2008 to 2010 as the “after” period. We

then regress average health index on  ∗  ,  ∗  , a Massachusetts dummy,

and year fixed effects. As shown in Table 7,  ∗  remains statistically significant in

both regressions despite the small sample, and the effect sizes in standard deviations (of the
individual-level health index) are similar to those from Table 4.
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In the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010), we also consider a different approach to inference
and ask how likely it would be to estimate similarly large health improvements simply by
picking any state at random. We re-estimate the baseline ordered probit regression with each of
the other 50 states as the “treated” unit. Only two states – Oregon and Florida – had larger
positive “treatment effects” than Massachusetts. The probability of obtaining as large a health
improvement as that estimated for Massachusetts by chance is therefore 4%, below the standard
5% significance level.21 Moreover, the result for Oregon could potentially be explained by the
2008 Medicaid expansion shown to improve self-assessed health by Finkelstein et al. (2011).
IVf. Other Health Outcomes
This section moves beyond the overall health index and explores the effect of the reform
on a variety of additional health outcomes: number of days out of the past 30 not in good
physical health, not in good mental health, and with health-related functional limitations;
activity-limiting joint pain; BMI; minutes per week of moderate physical activity and vigorous
physical activity; and smoking status. These variables were chosen because they satisfy two
conditions: 1) they are strongly and significantly correlated with the overall health index in the
expected direction (as shown in Appendix Table A4), and 2) they do not rely on a doctor’s
diagnosis, since a diagnosis requires medical access which is endogenous to the reform.22
Analyzing health outcomes beyond the overall self-assessed health index serves three
purposes. First, verifying that we also observe improvements in health using a wide range of
more specific (and therefore less subjective) questions increases our confidence that the reform
21

We do not report the full set of results for all 50 states due to space considerations; they are available upon
request.
22
The first condition excludes, for instance, alcoholic drinks per month, which is only weakly correlated with health
and in the opposite of the expected direction. The second condition excludes BRFSS questions that ask whether a
respondent has ever been diagnosed with a particular chronic condition, such as diabetes and asthma.
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did in fact improve objective – and not merely subjective – health. Second, examining additional
outcomes sheds light on the mechanisms through which this effect occurred. For instance,
obtaining health insurance can improve physical (or mental) health through increased utilization
of medical services, mental health through lower stress from reduced financial risk, or health
behaviors through expanded access to advice and information. Third, including the health
behavior-related variables BMI and smoking tests a separate prediction of economic theory:
reduced financial vulnerability to health shocks from insurance coverage could cause people to
take more health risks, a phenomenon known as “ex ante moral hazard” (e.g. Dave and Kaestner,
2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2011).
Days not in good physical and mental health, days with health-related limitations, and
minutes of moderate and vigorous exercise per week are non-negative count variables with
variances higher than the means. We therefore estimate negative binomial models for these
outcomes. The conditional expectation is given by
I JU |V , W M = V

(11)

where U is the number of days or minutes, W is the over-dispersion coefficient, and V is
defined by

V = exp([ + [ ( ∗  ) + [ ( ∗  ) + #!" \% + ] + ^ )

(12)

The treatment effect on the treated is defined as

H,PQ, = exp@[ + [ + #,NO," \% + ]PQ + ^ B − exp@[ + #,NO," \% + ]PQ + ^ B (13)

while the average treatment effect on the treated is the mean of H among Massachusetts residents
in the “after” period.
For the binary outcome variables (activity-limiting joint pain and smoking status), we
estimate probit models of the form
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Pr( = 1) = Φ(_ + _ ( ∗  ) + _ ( ∗  ) + #!" `% + a + b

(14)

with the treatment effect on the treated being

H,PQ, = Φ(_ + _ + #!" `% + &PQ + b ) − Φ(_ + #!" `% + aPQ + b ) . 23

(15)

Body mass index is continuous, so we estimate a linear regression in which the treatment effect
is simply the coefficient estimate for  ∗  .

Some of the health-related questions were not asked in Massachusetts in certain years,
necessitating restrictions to the sample. Activity-limiting joint pain and the two measures of
exercise are only available in odd-numbered survey years, meaning that the “during” period
spans only six months (January 2007 to June 2007). We therefore combine those six months with

the rest of 2007 and 2009 and classify the two years as the “after” period, dropping the  ∗
 interaction from those regressions. Additionally, the physical health, mental health, and
health limitations variables are not available in 2002.
Table 8 presents the results using the full control group of 50 states.24 Health care reform
in Massachusetts is associated with reductions in the number of days not in good physical health,
not in good mental health, and with health-related functional limitations, as well as a lower
probability of having activity-limiting joint pain. The magnitudes of these reductions range from
0.018 to 0.033 standard deviations, roughly similar to the size of the effect for the overall health
status index. It therefore seems unlikely that the observed effect on the health index is driven
purely by the subjectivity of the question. Moreover, these results suggest that the reform
improved health more broadly than merely by reducing stress from lower financial risk.

23

We include cigarette tax as an additional covariate in the smoking regression.
To conserve space, we do not present the results from the full range of specifications from Table 4 for these other
health outcomes. Unreported regressions verify that the conclusions reached are not driven by the choice of control
group.
24
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Turning to the health-behavior related variables, the reform is associated with a 0.025
standard deviation reduction in BMI and a 0.036 standard deviation increase in moderate
exercise, but no statistically detectable effect on vigorous exercise or smoking. These results
suggest that expanded access to primary care improves at least some health behaviors, perhaps
through information or accountability. The increase in moderate but not vigorous exercise is
consistent with physician advice encouraging sedentary individuals to begin a light exercise
routine, rather than encouraging those who are already active to increase or intensity their
activity. The non-effect on smoking is consistent with evidence that smoking habits respond only
gradually to external factors (e.g. Courtemanche, 2009), but could also reflect the health
consequences of smoking already being widely-known even without physician access.
Importantly, none of the regressions provide any evidence of ex-ante moral hazard causing
individuals to take more health risks after obtaining insurance.
The final column of Table 8 presents the results using as the dependent variable a
“cardinalized overall health status index” equal to the predicted outcome from a regression of the
health index on the six most plausibly objective health outcomes: functional limitations, joint

pain, BMI, moderate exercise, vigorous exercise, and smoking (d = 0.27).25 This approach is
advocated by Ziebarth et al. (2010) and others as a way to handle reporting heterogeneity in selfassessed health. The impact of  ∗  remain positive and significant, and the effect size
in standard deviations is similar to those from Table 4. This provides further evidence that our
conclusions are not merely driven by subjectivity.
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We also considered dropping health limitations from the set of variables used to make the prediction, or using all
eight alternate health outcomes to make the prediction. The results were virtually identical.
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IVg. Heterogeneity
We next return to the actual overall health status index and examine heterogeneity in the
effect of Massachusetts health care reform on the bases of gender, age, race, and income. Kolstad
and Kowalski (2010) found the largest coverage expansions among men, young adults,
minorities, and those with low incomes. However, different effects on coverage do not
necessarily translate to different effects on health, as the impacts of coverage on health could
also be heterogeneous. We consider the following subsamples: women; men; ages 18-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75 and older; whites; blacks; Hispanics; other race; and household
incomes below $25,000, between $25,000 and $75,000, and above $75,000. We choose these
income splits in order to loosely align with the provisions of the reform, which specify that
health insurance be free up to 150% FPL ($23,050 for a family of four) and subsidized up to
300% ($69,150 for a family of four).26 We estimate the baseline ordered probit model for all
subsamples, with one exception. The baseline model gives an implausibly large magnitude for
the 75 and older subsample, which upon further investigation appears to be driven by differential
pre-treatment trends between Massachusetts and non-Massachusetts residents of that age group.
We therefore include linear state-specific trends for that subsample.27
Table 9 reports the results for the gender and age subsamples. The impact on health is
positive and significant for both women and men but stronger for women. Stratifying by age, the
effect is largest among the near-elderly aged 55-64, second largest among those 45-54, smaller
among the two groups below 45, and smaller still among the two elderly groups. Our finding that
26

2012 federal poverty lines are available at coverageforall.org/pdf/FHCE_FedPovertyLevel.pdf, accessed 6/26/12.
Since the BRFSS only reports income categories and lacks comprehensive information about household size, lining
up the categories to exactly match 150% and 300% of the poverty line is not possible.
27 Recall that differential pre-treatment trends did not appear to be an issue for the full sample, and including statespecific trends for the full sample did not meaningfully affect the results. This suggests that the baseline estimator
without state trends is still appropriate for the full sample, even if it is not for the 75 and over age group.
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the effect of the reform diminishes dramatically at age 65 is not surprising since individuals
eligible for Medicare cannot purchase insurance through the Connector (Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Massachusetts, 2006). It is interesting, though, that we still observe some evidence of health
improvements among the elderly despite Medicare. Only those seniors who have paid Medicare
taxes for at least ten years (or whose spouse has done so) are eligible for free Medicare Part A
(Johnson-Lans, 2005), and presumably those seniors ineligible for Medicare could purchase
community-rated insurance through the Connector. Indeed, in our data the reform increases the
coverage rate of the elderly by a statistically significant 0.3 percentage points, an effect similar to
that found by Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) using the National Inpatient Sample. Moreover,
seniors could be affected by system-wide changes in the delivery of health care following the
reform, such as reduced crowds in emergency rooms or the improvements in some dimensions of
quality of care noted by Kolstad and Kowalski (2010).
Table 10 stratifies by race and income. Chapter 58 improved health across all racial
subgroups, but the effect was largest for blacks and those of a race besides white, black, or
Hispanic. A back-of-the-envelope calculation provides a ballpark estimate of the extent to which
the reform reduced the health disparity between blacks and whites. In Massachusetts in the
“before” period, the mean health status indices of blacks and whites were 2.553 and 2.786,
respectively, for a difference of 0.233. The treatment effects imply changes in the health status
indices of blacks and whites of 0.081 and 0.036, for a difference of 0.045. We therefore estimate
that the reform reduced black-white health disparities by 19.3%. Stratifying by income, the
reform improved the health of all three income groups but had the largest effect amongst those
with incomes below $25,000 for whom insurance premiums are heavily or fully subsidized.
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IVh. Instrumental Variables

We close the empirical analysis by using  ∗  and  ∗  as

instruments to estimate the impact of having insurance coverage on health. This instrumental
variables approach requires stricter assumptions than the reduced-form model, as the reform
must only impact health along the extensive margin of insurance coverage, conditional on the
controls. This assumption would be violated if the reform also influenced health through the
intensive margin of coverage, for instance by causing some individuals to switch from highdeductible catastrophic coverage to more comprehensive coverage available through the
Connector. This assumption would also be violated if the reform affected the health of those who
did not switch insurance plans through system-wide changes to health care delivery or peer
effects. Despite these caveats, the instrumental variables analysis is useful because it estimates
the magnitude of the impact of insurance on health that would be necessary for the extensive
margin to be the only channel through which the reform influenced health. If the magnitude is
implausibly large, then other mechanisms must play a role as well. Since the assumption that the
entire effect on health occurs through the extensive margin of coverage is unlikely to hold for
Medicare beneficiaries, we exclude seniors from the analysis in this section.
The first stage predicts insurance coverage using the following linear probability model:

T = W + W ( ∗  ) + W ( ∗  ) + #!" f% + g + h + 

(15)

where T is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person reported having any health insurance
coverage. Because of the non-linearity of the second stage, we utilize a two-stage residual
inclusion (2SRI) approach in which the residual from the first-stage regression is included as an
additional regressor in the second stage. Terza et al. (2008) show that in non-linear contexts
2SRI gives consistent coefficient estimates, while traditional two stage least squares does not.
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The second stage is modeled as an ordered probit and the probabilities of being in each of the
five health states are given by,

Pr( = 0) = Φ(> − i T − #!" jk − i6 l − & − ' )

Pr( = ?) = Φ@>A − i T − #!" jk − i6 l − & − ' B − Φ@>AC −
i T − #!" jk − i6 l − & − ' B, ∀ E ∈ (2,3,4)
Pr( = 4) = 1 − Φ(>8 − i T − #!" jk − i6 l − & − ' )

(16)
(17)

(18)

where l is the first-stage residual. The effect of health insurance on the probability of being in

health state E is

∆nA = Pr( = E|T = 1) − Pr( = E|T = 0)

(19)

The asymptotic standard errors of these probabilities and the standard errors for the second stage
estimates were calculated following Terza (2011).28 Equation (19) represents the “local average
treatment effect” of insurance among those who obtained coverage as a result of the reform, and
is subject to the usual caveat regarding generalizability.
Table 11 reports the coefficient estimates of interest from the first and second stage
regressions for the full sample, along with the estimated impacts of insurance on the health state
probabilities. The first stage estimates an increase in the coverage rate of 1.9 percentage points in
the “during” period and 5.4 percentage points in the “after” period. The F statistic from a test of
the joint significance of  ∗  and  ∗  is large, suggesting the instruments
are sufficiently strong. Turning to the second stage, obtaining insurance leads to a positive and
statistically significant improvement in health. The first-stage residual is significant and
negatively associated with health, providing evidence that an OLS estimator would suffer from a
downward bias. Insurance is estimated to reduce the probabilities of being in poor, fair, and good
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Mata code is available upon request.
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health by 6.2, 9.8, and 8.5 percentage points, while increasing the probabilities of being in very
good and excellent health by 8.5 and 16 percentage points. The overall effect of insurance on the
health status index, encompassing changes in all five probabilities, is 0.585 of the sample
standard deviation.
These effects are strikingly large, but assessing their plausibility requires a comparison to
other estimates from the literature. Finkelstein et al. (2011) employ the cleanest research design
to date among studies of the impact of insurance on self-assessed health: a randomized
intervention in Oregon granting Medicaid eligibility to a subset of the uninsured. They estimate
that Medicaid enrollment increases the probability of being in good, very good, or excellent
health by 13.3 percentage points. The sum of our estimated effects on the probabilities of being
in those three health states is a similar 16 percentage points. The results from the two papers are
not directly comparable given the differences in populations, but this similarity suggests that it is
conceivable that the reform’s entire effect on the self-assessed health of the non-elderly could
have occurred through the extensive margin of coverage. Future research should more directly
investigate the roles of other potential channels.
We also conduct instrumental variables analyses for the gender, race, age, and income
subgroups, allowing us to assess whether the heterogeneity in the reform’s effect on health
observed in Section IVg comes from heterogeneity in the effect on coverage or the effect of
coverage. Appendix Tables A5 and A6 report the results. The coverage expansions are larger for
men than women, but women have greater health gains from coverage, explaining the greater net
effect of the reform for women. Among the age subsamples, those under 35 years old have the
largest gains in coverage, but also the smallest health improvements from obtaining coverage. Of
the non-elderly age groups, 55-64 year olds have the smallest effect of the reform on coverage
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but the largest effect of coverage on health. Stratifying by race shows that coverage rates
increase the most for non-black minorities but that the health effects of coverage are the largest
for blacks. Finally, the coverage expansions are the largest for the low-income group, second
largest for the middle-income group, and smallest for those with high incomes. However, the
effect of coverage on health is the strongest for the high income group.
V. Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of health care reform in Massachusetts on self-assessed
health using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). An ordered
probit difference-in-differences analysis showed that the reform increased the probability of
individuals reporting excellent or very good health while reducing their probability of reporting
good, fair, or poor health. These results were robust to alternative constructions of the control
group and the addition of state-level covariates. We did not find evidence that the estimates were
meaningfully impacted by differential pre-treatment trends or endogenous moving patterns.
Next, we examined a number of more specific health outcomes and found improvements in
physical health, mental health, functional limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and
moderate physical activity. Testing for heterogeneity revealed that women, minorities, nearelderly adults, and those with incomes low enough to qualify for the law’s subsidies experienced
the largest gains in health as a result of the reform. Finally, we embedded the reform in an
instrumental variables framework and estimated a large positive impact of obtaining health
insurance on health.
Perhaps the clearest limitation of our analysis is that all our health outcomes were selfreported. Our finding of similar results across a range of health outcomes with varying degrees of
subjectivity increases our confidence that our findings largely represent “real” changes in
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physical/mental health. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the observed
improvement in health could merely be due to a “warm glow” from acquiring health insurance.
To underscore this point, recall that our estimated effects of insurance on self-assessed health are
a similar magnitude to those of Finkelstein et al. (2011), and they found that a sizeable portion of
the reported health improvements following the Oregon experiment occurred prior to measurable
changes in overall health care utilization. Obtaining insurance coverage can reduce stress, which
can directly improve numerous aspects of health even without any additional medical care being
utilized, but Finkelstein et al. (2011) do raise the question of what the estimated improvements in
self-assessed health are capturing.
We argue that Finkelstein et al.’s (2011) finding regarding timing does not automatically
apply to our context for several reasons. First, their data only tracked individuals for a year after
the intervention, while we have 4½ years of data after first of the newly-insured in Massachusetts
obtained coverage and 3½ years after all major facets of the reform took effect. If a “warm glow”
from acquiring insurance was driving the effect, we would have expected the reported health
benefits from the reform to diminish over time, but as Table 5 shows this was not the case.
Second, other studies have documented changes in health care utilization in Massachusetts at
around the same time as we observed health improvements (Kowalski and Kolstand, 2010;
Miller, 2011a). Next, the newly insured in the Oregon experiment were winners of a random
lottery, which could lead to a stronger “warm glow” than simply acquiring health insurance from
a statewide intervention like the reform in Massachusetts. Accordingly, we consistently find that
the effects on health were small at best in the “during” period, which includes nine months after
those with incomes below 100% FPL became eligible for free coverage. We therefore do not
seem to observe the immediate spike in self-assessed health seen in the Oregon experiment.
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Nonetheless, as the necessary data become available it will be important to evaluate the impact
of the Massachusetts reform on unambiguously objective measures of health such as mortality.
Another natural question is the degree to which our results from Massachusetts can serve
as projections for the Affordable Care Act. The general strategies for obtaining nearly universal
coverage in both the Massachusetts and federal laws involved the same three-pronged approach
of non-group insurance market reforms, subsidies, and mandates, suggesting that the health
effects should be broadly similar. However, the federal legislation included additional costcutting measures such as Medicare cuts that could potentially mitigate the gains in health from
the coverage expansions. On the other hand, baseline uninsured rates were unusually low in
Massachusetts, so the coverage expansions – and corresponding health improvements – from the
Affordable Care Act could potentially be greater. Of course, larger coverage expansions may
mean higher costs, and costs should be weighed against benefits when evaluating the welfare
implications of reform.
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Table 1 – Similarities and Differences between the Massachusetts Reform and the National Reform (ACA)
Domain
Massachusetts reform
Modification of existing insurance markets
- No pre-existing condition exclusions (since 1996).
- Community rated premiums that can only vary by age and
smoking status (in place since 1996).
- Minimum standards for policies, including essential
benefits and maximum out of pocket expenditures.
- Creation of a state health insurance exchange where
insurance companies compete to offer three regulated
levels of coverage to small employers and individuals.
- Young adults must be allowed coverage on their parents’
plans for up to two years after they are no longer
dependents or until their 26th birthday.
Mandates
- Individuals are required to purchase coverage if affordable,
(based on income and family size) or pay a penalty of no
more than 50% of the insurance premium of the lowestcost insurance exchange plan for which they are eligible.
- Employers with more than 10 full time employees (FTE)
are required to offer policies with minimum standard or
pay a penalty of up to $295 annually per FTE.
Medicaid expansions and subsidies
- Medicaid expansions for children with household incomes
up to 300% of the poverty line (FPL), for long-term
unemployed up to 100% FPL, and for people with HIV up
to 200% FPL.
- Free coverage for all adults below 150% FPL. Sliding scale
of subsidies for adults up to 300% FPL.
Financing
- Redirection of federal funding to safety net providers.
- Redirection of the state uncompensated care pool, a
mechanism through which hospitals were able to bill the
state the cost of treating low-income patients.
- Individual and employer penalties.
- One-time assessment to health care providers and insurers.
- Since 2009, a $1 per pack cigarette tax.

National reform (ACA)
-

-

-

Employers with 50 employees or more are required to offer
policies with minimum standard or pay penalties that range
from $2,000-$3,000 per FTE.

-

Medicaid expansions to all individuals with incomes below
133% FPL.
Sliding scale of tax credits for people up to 400% FPL.
Tax credits for employers with 25 or fewer employees and
average annual wages less than $50,000 for offering
coverage.
Reduction of Medicare reimbursements.
Increase in the Medicare payroll tax and extension of this
tax to capital income for singles (families) with incomes
more than $200,000 ($250,000).
Individual and employer penalties.
Taxes on insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and medical
device manufactures.
Excise taxes on high-cost insurance plans (“Cadillac tax”).

-

-

-

Sources: Gruber (2011a, 2008b) and Harrington (2010).
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No pre-existing condition exclusions.
Community rated premiums that can only vary by age and
smoking status.
Minimum standards for policies, including essential
benefits and maximum out of pocket expenditures.
States must create a health insurance exchange where
insurance companies compete to offer four regulated levels
of coverage to small employers and individuals. States are
able to join multistate exchanges.
Young adults must be allowed coverage on their parents’
plans until their 26th birthday.
Individuals are required to purchase coverage if it costs no
more than 8% of income, or pay a penalty of the greater of
2.5 percent of taxable income or $695.

Table 2 – Pre-Treatment Means of Health Variables
Variable

MA
(n=35,990)
0.911
2.743
0.030
0.089
0.261
0.351
0.270
3.271
3.307
1.916
0.123
26.319
57.658
40.065
0.192

Any health insurance coverage
Overall health; 0 (poor) to 4 (excellent)
Poor health
Fair health
Good health
Very good health
Excellent health
Days not in good physical health (of last 30)++
Days not in good mental health (of last 30)++
Days with health limitations (of last 30)++
Activity-limiting joint problems+
Body mass index
Minutes of moderate exercise per day+
Minutes of vigorous exercise per day+
Currently smokes cigarettes

Other States
Difference
(n=1,177,056)
0.848
-0.063***
2.575
0.168***
0.041
-0.011***
0.112
-0.023***
0.294
-0.034***
0.336
0.015***
0.212
0.054***
3.479
-0.207***
3.437
-0.130*
2.080
-0.164***
0.133
-0.009**
26.992
-0.673***
58.788
-1.130
38.830
1.235
0.224
-0.032***

Notes: *** indicates difference between Massachusetts and other states is significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level;
* 5% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. + indicates variable from only oddnumbered survey years. ++ indicates variable from all years except 2002. Standard errors are available on request.
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Table 3 – Pre-Treatment Means of Control Variables
Variable

Massachusetts Other States
(n=35,990)
(n=1,177,056)
0.114
0.121
0.083
0.089
0.107
0.105
0.105
0.104
0.116
0.112
0.100
0.101
0.089
0.091
0.073
0.073
0.056
0.056
0.045
0.047
0.038
0.040
0.039
0.034
0.035
0.030
0.510
0.502
0.571
0.598
0.846
0.709
0.034
0.098
0.113
0.178
0.006
0.015
0.037
0.055
0.039
0.056
0.057
0.079
0.077
0.096
0.108
0.139
0.149
0.172
0.188
0.174
0.345
0.228
0.071
0.114
0.251
0.299
0.242
0.273
0.436
0.314
0.011
0.012
4.979
5.435
0.820
1.485
436.247
256.945
1.208
1.701

Age 18 to 24
Age 25 to 29
Age 30 to 34
Age 35 to 39
Age 40 to 44
Age 45 to 49
Age 50 to 54
Age 55 to 59
Age 60 to 64
Age 65 to 69
Age 70 to 74
Age 75 to 79
Age 80 or older
Female
Married
Race is non-Hispanic white
Race is non-Hispanic black
Race is Hispanic
Race is neither black nor white nor Hispanic
Income less than $10,000
Income $10,000 to $15,000
Income $15,000 to $20,000
Income $20,000 to $25,000
Income $25,000 to $35,000
Income $35,000 to $50,000
Income $50,000 to $75,000
Income $75,000 or more
Less than a high school degree
High school degree but no college
Some college but not four-year degree
College graduate
Currently pregnant
State unemployment rate
State cigarette tax (20010 $)
State physician density (per 10,000 residents)
State hospital density (per 10,000 residents)

Difference
-0.007*
-0.006**
0.002
0.001
0.004
-0.001
-0.003
0.000
0.000
-0.002
0.002
0.005***
0.005***
0.008*
-0.028***
0.137***
-0.063***
-0.065***
-0.009***
-0.018***
-0.017***
-0.022***
-0.019***
-0.031***
-0.023***
0.014***
0.117***
-0.043***
-0.048***
-0.031***
0.121***
-0.001
-0.456***
0.665***
179.302***
-0.493***

Notes: *** indicates difference between Massachusetts and other states is significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level;
* 5% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. Standard errors are available on request.
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Table 4 – Difference-in-Differences Ordered Probit Regressions

Full
Sample
Coefficient Estimates of Interest
0.017
MA*During
(0.006)**

MA*After

Match on
Pre-Tx.
Level

Dependent Variable: Overall Health
Match on Match on
New
Drop CA,
Pre-Tx.
Pre-Tx.
England
HI, ME,
Trend
Coverage
OR, VT

P(Very Good)
P(Excellent)
Overall Effect in
Std. Dev.
# Control States
Observations

Add State
Controls/
Trends

0.013

0.022

0.013

0.015

0.016

0.013

0.010

0.022

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.009)

(0.007)***

(0.007)*

(0.014)

(0.010)*

0.039

0.049

0.037

0.046

0.049

0.038

0.044

0.032

0.049

(0.006)***

(0.010)***

(0.008)***

(0.010)***

(0.007)***

(0.006)***

(0.008)***

(0.007)***

(0.010)***

(0.0003)***

P(Good)

Drop 2005

(0.016)

Average Treatment Effects on Treated (After Period)
-0.002
-0.003
-0.002
P(Poor)
P(Fair)

Synthetic
Control
Group

(0.0006)***

(0.0005)***

-0.002

-0.003

-0.002

-0.002

-0.002

-0.003

(0.0006)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0005)***

(0.0003)***

(0.0006)***

-0.005

-0.006

-0.004

-0.005

-0.006

-0.004

-0.005

-0.004

-0.006

(0.0007)***

(0.001)***

(0.0009)***

(0.001)***

(0.0009)***

(0.0007)***

(0.001)***

(0.0007)***

(0.001)***

-0.007

-0.008

-0.006

-0.008

-0.008

-0.007

-0.007

-0.005

-0.008

(0.0009)***

(0.002)***

(0.001)***

(0.002)***

(0.001)***

(0.001)***

(0.001)***

(0.001)***

(0.002)***

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.001

0.002

(0.0003)***

(0.0006)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0006)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0003)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0003)***

(0.0006)***

0.012

0.014

0.011

0.013

0.014

0.011

0.013

0.010

0.015

(0.002)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

(0.003)***

0.033

0.037

0.032

0.035

0.037

0.032

0.037

0.027

0.041

50
2,879,296

10
633,979

10
643,302

10
578,530

5
340,592

45
2,664,194

6

50
2,582,055

50
2,879,296

390,453

Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. In columns 2-5 and 7, standard errors are clustered at the state*year
level rather than state because of the small number of states. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions
include the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS
sampling weights.
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Table 5 – Testing for Differential Pre-Treatment Trends and Delayed Effects
Dependent Variable: Overall Health
2-Year Splits
1-Year Splits
0.004
MA*2003 to 2004
-(0.007)
MA*2005 to 2006
MA*2007 to 2008
MA*2009 to 2010

-0.014

--

(0.007)

0.032

--

(0.005)***

0.039

--

(0.007)***

-0.013

MA*2002

--

MA*2003

--

MA*2004

--

(0.008)

MA*2005

--

(0.007)***

MA*2006

--

MA*2007

--

(0.008)**

MA*2008

--

(0.008)***

MA*2009

--

(0.010)***

MA*2010

--

(0.009)**

2,879,296

2,879,296

Observations

(0.010)

-0.014
(0.009)

0.010
-0.039
-0.0009
(0.009)

0.026
0.024
0.036
0.028

Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown; average treatment effects on the treated are
available upon request. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state,
are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level;
* 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables, state fixed
effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of all
50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.
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Table 6 – Testing for Endogenous Moving Patterns
Dependent Variable: Predicted Health Status
Coefficient
Estimates
-0.008
MA*During
(0.004)

-0.008

MA*After

(0.008)

Effect in Standard Deviations (After Period)
Observations

-0.016
2,888,559

Notes: The coefficient estimates are equal to the treatment effects because
the model is linear. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered
by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1%
level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. The regression includes state fixed effects,
and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of
all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling
weights.

Table 7 – Regressions with Aggregated Data
Dependent Variable: Average Health Status
State-Level with Three
Time Periods
MA*During
MA*After
Effect in Standard Deviations (After Period)
Observations

0.011

Annual with Two
Cross-Sectional Units
(MA and not MA)
0.018

(0.006)

(0.013)

0.029

0.032

(0.005)***

(0.014)*

0.027

0.030

153

20

Notes: The coefficient estimates are equal to the treatment effects because the model is linear. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors (clustered by state in the first column) are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant
at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. The first regression includes state fixed effects and dummies for the
during and after periods; the second regression includes year fixed effects and a dummy for MA. The control group
consists of all 50 other states in the first regression, and one group consisting of all individuals from the 50 other
states in the second regression. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights when aggregating.

46

Table 8 – Regression Results for Other Health Outcomes
Dependent
Variable:

MA*After
ATE on Treated
Effect in Std.
Deviations
Observations

Days not
in Good
Physical
Health
-0.079

Days not
in Good
Mental
Health
-0.051

Days with
Health
Limitations
-0.065

ActivityLimiting
Joint Pain

BMI

Minutes of Minutes of
Moderate
Vigorous
Exercise
Exercise

Smoker

-0.036

-0.143

0.039

-0.002

0.006

Cardinalized
Overall
Health
0.013

(0.011)***

(0.012)***

(0.013)***

(0.010)***

(0.047)**

(0.018)**

(0.018)

(0.007)

(0.004)***

-0.255

-0.165

-0.128

-0.006

-0.143

2.026

-0.079

0.001

0.013

(0.037)***

(0.041)***

(0.028)***

(0.002)***

(0.047)**+

(0.912)*

(0.608)

(0.002)

(0.004)***+

-0.033

-0.022

-0.022

-0.018

-0.025

0.036

-0.001

0.002

0.027

2,642,885

2,649,994

2,663,473

1,333,179

2,794,388

1,217,299

1,217,299

2,878,751

1,122,083

Notes: + indicates the treatment effect and coefficient estimate are equal because the model is linear. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by
state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control
variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. MA*During is also included for all outcomes except joint pain, exercise, and
cadrinalized health, which are not available in odd-numbered survey years. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the
BRFSS sampling weights.
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Table 9 – Heterogeneity in the Effect on Health by Gender and Age
Dependent Variable: Overall Health

MA*After

Gender
Women
Men
0.046
0.029
(0.006)***

(0.006)***

Age
18-34
0.023

35-44
0.021

45-54
0.036

55-64
0.060

65-74
0.019

75+
0.015

(0.010)*

(0.008)**

(0.007)***

(0.011)***

(0.006)**

(0.020)

Average Treatment Effects on Treated
P(Poor)

-0.003

-0.002

-0.0004

-0.0007

-0.002

-0.005

-0.002

-0.002

(0.0003)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0002)*

(0.0002)**

(0.0004)***

(0.0009)***

(0.0006)***

(0.003)

P(Fair)

-0.005

-0.004

-0.002

-0.002

-0.004

-0.008

-0.003

-0.003

(0.0007)***

(0.0008)***

(0.0009)*

(0.0008)**

(0.0008)***

(0.001)***

(0.0009)***

(0.003)

P(Good)

-0.008

-0.005

-0.005

-0.004

-0.006

-0.009

-0.002

-0.0007

(0.001)***

(0.001)***

(0.002)*

(0.002)**

(0.001)***

(0.002)***

(0.0007)***

(0.0009)

P(Very Good)

0.002

0.001

0.0001

0.00005

0.0009

0.004

0.002

0.003

(0.0003)***

(0.0003)***

(-0.0001)

(-0.0001)

(0.0002)***

(0.0009)***

(0.0007)***

(0.004)

P(Excellent)

0.014

0.009

0.008

0.007

0.011

0.017

0.005

0.003

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

(0.003)*

(0.003)**

(0.002)***

(0.003)***

(0.001)***

(0.004)

0.039

0.024

0.022

0.018

0.029

0.049

0.017

0.015

1,733,131

1,146,165

485,376

512,575

614,489

563,405

398,264

305,187

Overall Effect in
Std. Dev.
Observations

Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; *
5 % level. All regressions include MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. For
reasons discussed in the text, the 75+ regression also includes state-specific linear trends. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.
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Table 10 – Heterogeneity in the Effect on Health by Race and Income
Dependent Variable: Overall Health
Race
White
MA*After

P(Very Good)
P(Excellent)
Overall Effect in Std. Dev.
Observations

Other

0.036

0.091

0.041

0.081

0.061

0.033

0.021

(0.012)***

(0.016)*

(0.021)***

(0.007)***

(0.007)***

(0.008)**

(0.0003)***

P(Good)

Hispanic

(0.005)***

Average Treatment Effects on Treated
-0.002
P(Poor)
P(Fair)

Black

Household Income
$25,000<$25,000
>$75,000
$75,000

-0.006

-0.003

-0.009

-0.009

-0.002

-0.0004

(0.001)***

(0.001)*

(0.002)***

(0.001)***

(0.0004)***

(0.0001)***

-0.004

-0.013

-0.006

-0.011

-0.011

-0.004

-0.001

(0.0005)***

(0.002)***

(0.003)*

(0.003)***

(0.001)***

(0.0009)***

(0.0006)***

-0.006

-0.013

-0.005

-0.009

-0.001

-0.006

-0.005

(0.0009)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)**

(0.002)***

(0.0001)***

(0.001)***

(0.002)*

0.001

0.008

0.003

0.009

0.009

0.003

-0.001

(0.0002)***

(0.001)***

(0.001)*

(0.003)***

(0.001)***

(0.0007)***

(0.0004)***

0.011

0.024

0.011

0.020

0.012

0.009

0.008

(0.001)***

(0.003)***

(0.004)**

(0.005)***

(0.001)***

(0.002)***

(0.003)*

0.030

0.078

0.033

0.07

0.055

0.029

0.020

2,320,271

222,581

287,895

48,549

842,088

1,346,946

690,262

Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; *
5 % level. All regressions include MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The
control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.
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Table 11 – Instrumental Variables
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage
Coefficient Estimates
0.019
MA*During

(0.002)***

MA*After

0.054
(0.003)***

171.42
1st Stage F Statistic
Second Stage: Overall Health
Coefficient Estimates
0.688
Insurance

(0.112)***

1st Stage Residual

-0.663
(0.112)***

Local Average Treatment Effects
P(Poor)
P(Fair)
P(Good)
P(Very Good)
P(Excellent)

-0.062
(0.011)***

-0.098
(0.015)***

-0.085
(0.013)***

0.085
(0.013)***

0.16
(0.026)***

Overall Effect in Standard Deviations
Observations

0.585
2,172,797

Notes: A linear probability model is estimated in the first stage so the coefficient
estimate equals the treatment effect. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust
and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at
the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include MA*During,
the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for
each month in each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states.
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.
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Appendix Tables (for online publication only)
Table A1 – Estimating Effect on Health Using Series of Probits
Dependent
Variable:
Coefficient Estimates
MA*During
MA*After

P(Fair or
Better)

P(Good or
Better)

P(Excellent)

0.040

0.030

0.028

0.001

(0.010)***

(0.007)***

(0.009)***

(0.007)

0.070

0.062

0.056

0.018

(0.006)***

(0.009)***

(0.008)***

(0.007)**

Average Treatment Effect on Treated (After Period)
0.010
0.004
MA*After
Effect in Std.
Deviations
Observations

P(Very Good or
Better)

0.018

0.006

(0.0004)***

(0.001)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)**

0.018

0.027

0.037

0.014

2,879,296

2,879,296

2,879,296

2,879,296

Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically
significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables,
state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS
sampling weights.

Table A2 – Estimating Effect on Health Using Series of Linear Probability Models
Dependent
P(Fair or Better)
P(Good or Better)
Variable:
Coefficient Estimates = Average Treatment Effects
0.002
0.007
MA*During
(0.0008)*

(0.001)***

P(Very Good or
Better)

P(Excellent)

0.011

-0.001

(0.003)***

(0.002)

0.004

0.011

0.020

0.003

(0.0004)***

(0.002)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)

Effect in Std.
Deviations

0.020

0.031

0.040

0.008

Observations

2,879,296

2,879,296

2,879,296

2,879,296

MA*After

Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically
significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables,
state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS
sampling weights.
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Table A3 – Falsification Tests Using Pre-Treatment Data
Dependent Variable: Overall Health
Before: 2001-2003
After: 2004-2005

Before: 2001-2002
After: 2003-2005

--

--

Before: 2001-2002
During: 2003
After: 2004-2005
-0.008

-0.004

-0.006

-0.008

(0.003)

(0.006)

(0.005)

1,144,440

1,144,440

1,144,440

MA*During
MA*After
Observations

(0.008)

Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown; average treatment effects on the treated are available upon request. Standard
errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at
the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-level control variables, state fixed
effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations
are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.

Table A4 – Correlations Between Overall Health and Other Health Outcomes

Days not in Good Physical Health
Days not in Good Mental Health
Days with Health Limitations
Activity-Limiting Joint Pain
BMI
Minutes of Moderate Exercise
Minutes of Vigorous Exercise
Smoker

Correlation with Overall Health
-0.472***
-0.255***
-0.381***
-0.322***
-0.232***
0.063***
0.130***
-0.118***

*** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level.
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.
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Table A5 – Instrumental Variables: Stratified by Gender and Age
Gender
Women
Men
18-34
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage
Coefficient Estimates
0.023
0.016
0.027
MA*During
(0.002)***

MA*After
1st Stage F Statistic

(0.003)***

(0.004)***

Age
35-44

45-54

55-64

0.016

0.012

0.021

(0.004)***

(0.002)***

(0.002)***

0.042

0.066

0.081

0.048

0.043

0.042

(0.003)***

(0.004)***

(0.006)***

(0.003)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)***

159.19

138.04

224.35

142.34

201.3
105.63
Second Stage: Overall Health

Coefficient Estimates
Insurance
1st Stage Residual

1.114

0.420

0.355

0.413

0.871

1.424

(0.159)***

(0.107)***

(0.122)**

(0.164)*

(0.164)***

(0.266)***

-1.075

-0.402

-0.209

-0.401

-0.977

-1.566

(0.156)***

(0.109)***

(-0.126)

(0.162)*

(0.165)***

(0.275)***

Local Average Treatment Effects
P(Poor)
P(Fair)
P(Good)
P(Very Good)
P(Excellent)
Overall Effect in Std. Dev.
Observations

-0.135

-0.030

-0.011

-0.025

-0.111

-0.302

(0.019)***

(0.009)***

(0.003)***

(0.010)*

(0.017)***

(0.046)***

-0.156

-0.058

-0.047

-0.056

-0.122

-0.142

(0.017)***

(0.015)***

(0.014)***

(0.022)*

(0.020)***

(0.020)***

-0.084

-0.063

-0.073

-0.068

-0.067

-0.037

(0.015)***

(0.015)***

(0.027)**

(0.028)*

(0.020)***

(0.015)*

0.151

0.046

0.029

0.042

0.127

0.209

(0.012)***

(0.013)***

(0.007)***

(0.017)*

(0.015)***

(0.019)***

0.223

0.106

0.102

0.108

0.172

0.198

(0.037)***

(0.026)***

(0.038)**

(0.044)*

(0.041)***

(0.053)***

0.943
1,299,806

0.357
872,991

0.317
483,775

0.458
512,155

0.747
613,948

1.049
562,919

See notes for Table 11.
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Table A6 – Instrumental Variables: Stratified by Age and Income
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage
Coefficient Estimates
0.014
-0.015
0.041
0.074
MA*During
(0.002)***

MA*After
1st Stage F Statistic

(0.006)**

(0.007)***

(0.019)***

Household Income
<$25,000
$25k-$75k
>$75,000

0.064

0.016

0.006

(0.008)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)**

0.041

0.056

0.093

0.136

0.138

0.070

0.015

(0.002)***

(0.004)***

(0.006)***

(0.011)***

(0.009)***

(0.003)***

(0.002)***

154.01

412.98

31.83

177.77

109.23
125.02
88.78
Second Stage: Overall Health

Coefficient Estimates
Insurance
1st Stage Residual

0.905

1.31

0.319

0.793

0.446

0.405

1.440

(0.132)***

(0.200)***

(0.157)*

(0.194)***

(0.069)***

(0.116)***

(0.538)**

-0.905

-1.276

-0.240

-0.851

-0.481

-0.341

-1.300

(0.134)***

(0.205)***

(-0.152)

(0.196)***

(0.075)***

(0.117)***

(0.533)*

-0.093

-0.194

-0.025

-0.114

-0.068

-0.026

-0.138

(0.016)***

(0.032)***

(0.014)

(0.027)***

(0.010)***

(0.006)***

(0.030)***

Local Average Treatment Effects
P(Poor)
P(Fair)
P(Good)
P(Very Good)
P(Excellent)
Overall Effect in Std. Dev.
Observations

-0.114

-0.175

-0.058

-0.107

-0.071

-0.057

-0.189

(0.014)***

(0.015)***

(0.029)*

(0.024)***

(0.011)***

(0.015)***

(0.043)***

-0.112

-0.022

-0.029

-0.046

-0.007

-0.069

-0.182

(0.015)***

(0.013)*

(0.013)*

(0.020)*

(0.005)

(0.022)***

(0.092)*

0.117

0.158

0.038

0.106

0.06

0.052

0.203

(0.014)***

(0.010)***

(-0.020)

(0.020)***

(0.008)***

(0.011)***

(0.013)***

0.202

0.233

0.075

0.160

0.086

0.101

0.306

(0.030)***

(0.040)***

(0.035)*

(0.045)***

(0.015)***

(0.032)***

(0.165)

0.783

1.087

0.271

0.667

0.388

0.381

1.486

1,704,544

182,200

247,267

38,786

524,090

1,036,339

612,368

See notes for Table 11.
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